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Book Review
How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA. By R. Neely. Yale University
Press. 1981.
REVIEWED BY ALAN D. HORNSTEIN*
Because of the great number of books published each year, more
are likely to be ignored than reviewed and, ordinarily, books like this
one are better left to perish quietly. When, however, the book concerns
the role of the courts in the governing of America and the author not
only graduated from a prestigious law school but also became, as the
book's jacket attests, "the youngest judge of a court of last resort in the
English-speaking world," served on that court for seven years and is
now its Chief Justice, the publication ought not go unremarked.
Despite its title, this is not a book which describes or analyzes the
methods by which courts govern America; it is rather about why Chief
Justice Neely of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia be-
lieves they should. Given the book's message, it is perhaps fortunate
that its weaknesses are so transparent.
The book is largely an attempt to demolish the strawman the au-
thor erects in his Preface: "the assertion that courts are a uniquely un-
democratic institution in an otherwise completely democratic society."'
It is not difficult to demonstrate the falsity of that assertion. I know of
no moderately intelligent or educated person who would agree with it.
Nonetheless, the courts are the least democratic of the three branches
of government. (That the legislative and executive branches are not
instantly or totally responsive to day-by-day changes in public senti-
ment does not alter the case.)
By demonstrating that the other branches of government are not
particularly democratic, the book seeks to refute the argument for judi-
cial restraint that rests on the undemocratic nature of courts. Chief
Justice Neely attempts to support his position, however, on the citizen's
failure to assert the power with which the democratic ideal provides
him. The power of money, incumbency, bureaucracy, the political
machine and, perhaps most important of all, inertia undeniably influ-
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ences the American political process. Yet, to view this as proof that
democracy has perished is to view civic lethargy or dim-wittedness as
endemic and the citizen as a manipulable tool of entrenched power.
To say that popular control of the political system is rare is not to
say that the citizen is impotent or even that the system is undemocratic.
The choice not to exert power but to defer to established mechanisms
may be as much an exercise in democracy as the more obvious exhibi-
tion of political energy. Moreover, recent events - the decision of
President Johnson not to run in 1968, the resignation of Richard Nixon
as a result of the Watergate affair are perhaps the most obvious exam-
ples - demonstrate that at some point the citizenry does voice its con-
cerns. Voluntary acquiescence is not equivalent to lack of power.
Neely remarks upon the closed-door, secret machinations of the
legislative and executive branches and contrasts this with the visible,
public activities of the courts, urging that the greater visibility of judi-
cial action adds a measure of safety to judicial power. It surely is true
that much legislative and executive activity takes place in cloakrooms
and private offices. Yet, despite Neely's assertion that everything
courts do is public,2 plainly the most important work of appellate
courts - the decision-making process - also proceeds behind closed
doors and under the strictest security. Nor, as Neely admits, does the
written and published opinion always record the reasons underlying
the decision.3 Indeed, when Neely discusses his own court's decision
striking down the structure of state juvenile control as unconstitu-
tional,4 he tells us: "What I reasoned about the case myself and what I
wrote in the court's opinion were two entirely different things."5
Of course, not everything contained within a judicial opinion pre-
cisely represents the views of its author; and this especially applies to
majority opinions. The collegial nature of appellate courts and the
consequent need to accommodate others' views may result in an opin-
ion reflecting compromises within the court rather than the position of
only the writer.6 Yet Neely clearly is not referring to this sort of incon-
2. Id. at 193.
3. See, e.g., W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 8 (1981); B. WOODWARD
& S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHRENpassim (1979).
4. State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977). Among the many
irritants in this book is the absence of any notes or references to sources, making it more a
chore than need be to verify the author's information. Although extensive references may
not be as approprite in a volume aimed at the general reader or for non-technical or heuris-
tic material, cf. Hornstein, The Myth of Legal Reasoning, 40 MD. L. REV. 338, 338 n.*
(1981), it does not seem much to ask that at least minimal references be provided.
5. R. NEELY, suipra note 1, at 15.
6. Cf. Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples." Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court,
1974 DUKE L.J. 59.
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sistency between his view and his opinion. Rather, he seems to say that
he fabricated the opinion to sustain the myth that courts apply princi-
ples of law to factual situations, while in reality Neely believed it desir-
able to force the legislature to rethink the problem of juvenile justice.
He does not tell us if his colleagues on the court shared in the mendac-
ity or whether they agreed with the reasons adumbrated in the opinion.
Chief Justice Neely points out that courts serve two functions in
American society: the day-to-day function of resolving conflicts for
private litigants, in which he claims they do not work very well,7 and
the political function of ordering the economic, social and political
structure of the nation, in which he maintains they perform fairly well.8
Because it is not subject to legislative change, constitutional law is the
primary vehicle of judicial governance, and, as such, the principal sub-
ject of the book.9 Courts govern in a political sense, according to the
author, because "constitutional law is not 'law' " in any intelligible
sense: "[real law involves rules which are immediately intelligible to
anyone trained in the profession of law and which can be applied con-
sistently to any set of facts by most people so trained. . . . [G]iven a
legal principle and a set of facts to which that principle could be ap-
plied in order to reach a legal resolution of a dispute, nine out of ten
[lawyers] would arrive at the same answer."' 0 Under this test, the
Supreme Court of the United States certainly is not in the "real" law
business; but then no appellate court is or could be.
Litigation is expensive. Ordinarily, although subject to exceptions
more publicized than numerous," frivolous claims are not brought to
court. Of those that are, fewer yet are appealed. Cases in which the
law is clear may go to trial because the facts are disputed. Appeals,
however, are not taken to resolve factual disputes; nor are they taken
where the law and its application is clear to nine out of ten lawyers.
Those cases are settled. Thus, it is not only constitutional law that is
not "real" law under Neely's definition but almost all law that appel-
late courts are called upon to declare. To define law as Neely does is to
put virtually all appellate courts out of the law business. But then
Neely's distinction between courts as arbiters of law in private dispute
settlement and courts as participants in the political process loses its
utility.
7. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at xiii, 195.
8. Id. at 195.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 4 n.2.
11. See Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man. Litigation and Rights Consciousness in
Modern America, 39 MD. L. REV. 661 (1980).
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That what Karl Llewellyn called "leeways" 12 exist in constitu-
tional adjudication makes the enterprise no less "law" than, for exam-
ple, commercial litigation in which there are similar "leeways." The
differences lie not so much in the legitimate differences in judges' views
of the law as in the sorts of questions with which the litigation is con-
cerned. Constitutional determinations usually touch more deeply on
fundamental questions of value.
The uncertainty - the lack of "real" law - is simply more easily
perceived in constitutional litigation. First, the communications media
tend to focus what little attention they pay to the workings of the judi-
ciary on constitutional adjudication. Additionally, because the issues
frequently involve fundamental questions of value rather than more
clearly technical matters, the general public feels more competent to
evaluate constitutional decisions and to comment with an apparent ap-
preciation of the problems and their solutions. The public speaks with
greater assurance on questions of abortion, the death penalty or school
prayer, for example, than on questions involving such issues as the de-
sirability or application of the parol evidence rule or the hearsay rule.
Yet there is likely to be substantial disagreement about the legal princi-
ples involved in the latter as well as in the former.
This conception, however, permits Neely to declare, "Sketching
the grand design of the law is the social equivalent of architecture ...
[U]nfortunately not all the members of [the appellate] courts are archi-
tects - many are simply craftsmen. Unlike the architect, who is al-
ways searching for the better material, more functional design, and
more energy-efficient construction, the craftsman is concerned with ex-
ecuting the old designs."13 The difficulty with this position is similar to
that noted by a colleague of mine with respect to Justice Douglas:
Judges are obliged to decide cases agreeably to the Constitution and
laws. Justice Douglas, and apparently Chief Justice Neely, decide "as
if all there was to it was to do justice agreeably to his conscience."15
Chief Justice Neely admits to this: "[I1f one has power, what is it for
except to do good things?"' 6
The book is replete with assertions either patently false or unsup-
ported by any evidence: "[A]II judges except magistrates must be law-
yers";17 "[i]t often happened that when the police came to search a
12. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
13. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 166.
14. Isenbergh, Book Review, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 415, 416 (1981).
15. Id.
16. R. NEELY, supra niote 1, at 187.
17. Id. at 205.
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house in the 1960s, their routine procedure involved turning out dresser
or desk drawers, making holes in the wall, ripping apart all the beds,
tearing up the pillows, kicking down the doors. .. ";I "[p]olice officers
routinely lie. . ."I' and so forth. Neely charges Justice Frankfurter 20
with a theory of judicial restraint the alleged inconsistencies of which
are exaggerated at best. "According to [his] theory, it was all right for
courts to intervene in the political process through imaginative inter-
pretations of the Constitution in defense of human or civil rights, but
not to preserve the status quo in the economic system. '" 2 ' Though such
theories undoubtedly exist, it is difficult to ascribe them to Justice
Frankfurter in light of his opinions in cases such as Gobitis,22 Dennis,23
Wo/f,24 Adamson25 or his dissents in Capitol Greyhound,26 Mapp,27 or
Baker v. Carr.28
Even more inexcusable than his misstatements of fact and law is
his transparent speciousness of argument. In a chapter devoted to illus-
trating his criteria for judging the propriety of judicial intervention, 29
Chief Justice Neely argues that criminal law reform, particularly that
undertaken by the Warren Court in the 1960's, is the nearly perfect
example of appropriate judicial governance. Apart from minor factual
errors that merely annoy the reader - Escobedo v. Illinois,3" for exam-
ple, was decided in 1964, not 1963 as Neely asserts31 - the chapter
exhibits the sophistry of the book as a whole.
The need for the "revolution" in criminal due process 32 resulted,
according to Neely, from the wholesale violation of the rights of the
accused. "[The system] resembled some of the more unpleasant fea-
tures of Nazi Germany or modern Russia ... -"3 The courts had to
18. Id. at 156.
19. Id.
20. It has not been a good period for Justice Frankfurter. See, e.g., H. HIRSCH, THE
ENIGMA OF FELIX. FRANKFURTER (1981); B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER
CONNECTION (1982).
21. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 2-3.
22. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
23. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
24. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
25. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
26. Capitol Greyhounds Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 548 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
27. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Harlan & Frankfurter, J.J., dissenting).
28. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29. See R. NEELY, supra note 1, ch. VI.
30. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
31. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 151.
32. See C. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT & ITS CRITICS 77 (1968).
33. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 155.
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respond because reform of criminal procedure was not on the legisla-
tive agenda - criminals being a rather ineffective pressure group. Sev-
eral aspects of this are noteworthy. First, it certainly was true then and,
probably to a lesser extent remains true today, that treatment of the
criminally accused is less than entirely humane; indeed it may some-
times be brutal. To say that, however, is a far cry from equating it with
Nazi Germany's. Second, although he deals superficially with the
problem of separation of powers - why the judiciary rather than the
legislature was the appropriate forum for realizing reform - Neely
pays virtually no attention to the problem of federalism - why the
national judiciary was a better forum than the state courts for effecting
change.34 Finally, he justifies judicial action by claiming that other
branches of government will not or cannot act.35 That justification,
however, does not become valid on the basis of repetition.
For Neely, the lynch-pin of criminal law reform was the complex
of exclusionary rules prohibiting the introduction of evidence obtained
in violation of the rights of the accused. This "ingenious doctrine," "a
new, judge-made, constitutional remedy, '' 36 was necessary according to
Neely because no other remedy would assure the correction of the insti-
tutional abuses. Private damage actions against offending public offi-
cials, for example, were unlikely to be effective at least in part because
"[p]olice officers routinely lie."' 37 Again, several facts warrant com-
ment: The exclusionary rule was hardly an invention of the Warren
Court. The federal courts had used it since 1914.38 What was new
about the Warren Court's approach was that it applied the rule to the
states and, as noted, Neely ignores the problem of federalism necessar-
ily implicated in that application. Additionally, although much has
been written on both sides of the question,39 whether the exclusionary
rule in fact deters institutional misconduct remains unsettled. More-
over, if other remedies are ineffective because of official perjury, it is
difficult to comprehend why the incidence of perjury should decrease if
the remedy is to free the criminal defendant. If "[p]olice officers rou-
tinely lie,"' one would think they would be as likely to do so when the
34. Cf. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977).
35. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 103.
36. Id. at 156.
37. Id.
38. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
39. Compare, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Warren, C.J.) with Burger, Who Will
Watch the Watchmen?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1964). See generally Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665 (1970).
40. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 156.
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subject matter of their testimony has to do with, for example, whether a
suspect voluntarily waived his rights or consented to a search.
Ignoring these difficulties as well as the lack of evidence to support
his statements, Chief Justice Neely asserts, "The streets began to swarm
with released criminals."'" The Supreme Court, he declares, reversed
hundreds of convictions and released the defendants. To reverse this
process, law enforcement officials began to abide by the rules.42 In fact,
he cites no evidence to indicate that the rate of convictions changed
significantly following these decisions. However, the number of peti-
tions filed for post-conviction relief increased dramatically, 43 so per-
haps these decisions merely increased the number of cases filed in
federal court. Similarly, whatever the increase in civility during the
past several years, it is at best difficult to ascribe it to the decisions of
the Supreme Court.
Neely views the Warren Court's contribution to criminal proce-
dure in the 1960's as the equivalent of his own court's contribution to
juvenile justice in 1977. Given his attitude toward the judicial func-
tion, it comes as no surprise that he claims there is a high correlation
between "good judging and extensive political background."'  (It is
perhaps unfair to note Neely's own marginally successful political
background.) Chief Justice Neely's primary example, again not sur-
prisingly, is Earl Warren.45 Now whatever one may think of Warren's
contribution, as a judge his performance was simply dismal. The
judges' judges - Holmes, the second Harlan, Judge Friendly of the
Second Circuit come to mind - are not known for their political back-
ground. Their opinions evidence craft, not architecture.
Neely's view of the unimportance of craft is perhaps best illus-
trated by the book's general level of sloppiness. Let one example suf-
fice. In describing the sorts of instances in which courts may substitute
for legislatures, Chief Justice Neely suggests what he calls "legislative
oversight, that is, failure to flesh out remedies necessary to implement a
legislative policy."'46 His example is what he sees as the Supreme
Court's implication of private causes of action under section 504 of the
41. Id. at 157.
42. Id. at 157-59.
43. Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1041
(1970). It is at least equally likely that the increase resulted from decisions making access to
federal post-conviction relief more widely available. E.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
44. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 215.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 68.
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Rehabilitation Act of 197347 which prohibits discrimination against
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in any federally funded
program or activity.
What is remarkable about this, of course, is that the Court had not
implied a private cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act;48 in-
deed, the Court specifically declined the invitation to do so on two oc-
casions.4 9 What is one to make of errors of this kind by the Chief
Justice of a court of last resort in the context of an apologia for an
activist judiciary? Surely it is not too much to ask that one seeking
greater power on the grounds of the institutional merits of the courts at
least take the pains demanded by accuracy. When one is out to reor-
ganize society - to be an architect rather than a craftsman - the de-
tails of craft apparently become insignificant in the light of the grand
design. Yet without craft as a foundation, the result of social architec-
ture is likely to be jerry-built indeed.
The danger in Neely's view of the appropriate judicial role might
be analogized to that presented by an automobile with a powerful mo-
tor but no steering mechanism or brakes. His perception of the judge's
power and role - his institutional conceit - is breathtaking: "At this
point in our political development American courts are like the Zeus of
the Prometheus legend; they are young, immature gods with limitless
and inadequately understood power."" ° After noting Polybius' idea
that pure forms of government devolve into their negative analogs -
democracy into anarchy, aristocracy into oligarchy and so on5 -
Neely admits puzzlement over the ultimate result if his prescription for
47. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), as amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1979).
48. The Court's approach to the implication of private causes of action under federal
statutes is substantially more grudging of late, see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1
(1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), than had once been the case, see, e.g., J.I. Case v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)
(interpreting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)).
Nonetheless several courts of appeals have found an implicit private remedy under the Re-
habilitation Act. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979);
United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v. Nyquist,
553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
49. University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 1835 (1981); Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404-05 n.5 (1979). Although Camenisch may have
been decided contemporaneously with the publication of this book the Court's grant of certi-
orari in the case, 442 U.S. 404 (1980), had made plain that the question remained open.
50. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 11.
51. Id. at 216. Although Neely credits Polybius with this insight, Aristotle had noted the
categories and their "deviations" long before. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Bk. III, ch. 5, Bk. IV,
ch. 2 (H. Rackham trans. 1972).
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judicial government is followed: "What happens when Plato's mil-
lenium of the philosopher kings actually arrives, I am not sure. Polyb-
ius never told us what pure rule by judiciary would eventually
degenerate into."52
Chief Justice Neely does not suggest that the judiciary exercise un-
limited power. On the contrary, he suggests -criteria to determine the
sorts of issues appropriate for judicial determination53 and criteria to
determine those inappropriate for such treatment.5 4 What is frighten-
ing is the basis from which he derives these criteria. "[T]he limits on
court power in government are not set by either constitutional theory or
discoverable law, but rather by the tolerance of the countervailing pow-
ers." 55 Put more simply, the limits on the exercise of judicial power are
defined not by principle but by what one can get away with.
To entrust this power to judges, especially given Neely's view that
"every conceivable issue known to government can be phrased in con-
stitutional terms [in] an opinion justifying almost any result . ,",56 is
to abdicate to a single institution more power than prudence dictates.
When those who staff that institution believe themselves god-like, the
risks become unacceptable. And when these new gods are contemptu-
ous of even the forms of restraint, they become downright dangerous.
One might understand if not agree with the notion that constitu-
tional adjudication cannot be based upon neutral principles or rea-
soned analysis. Yet, as one reveiwer of two other recent works on the
legitimacy of judicial review has noted: "The conceit of Justices ex-
pressly imposing their own values rests on the mistaken notion that
because judges do make law, they ought to do so. A result oriented
jurisprudence does not follow inexorably from the insights of legal re-
alism."57 A comparison of Neely's book with the recent works of
Professors Choper 5 and Ely59 is embarrassing. Whatever the short-
comings of these works, they take seriously the notion that neutral and
intellectually defensible principles define the courts' role in American
society.
Chief Justice Neely, on the other hand, is condescending toward
the notion of constitutional law as a discipline subject to intellectual
52. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 217.
53. Id. at 168.
54. Id. at 188-89.
55. Id. at 217.
56. Id. at 10.
57. O'Brien, Book Review, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 1052, 1080 (1981).
58. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNC-
TIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980).
59. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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analysis. Such aggressive anti-intellectualism from one in his position
is astonishing. He finds it naive or just plain silly to expect reasoned
explication of legal principles. "Lawyers, certainly, who take seriously
recent U.S. Supreme Court historical scholarship as applied to the
Constitution also probably believe in the Tooth Fairy and the Easter
Bunny."'60 Neely's rebuke is not directed at the basis on which he be-
lieves courts render decisions but at the expectation that they might
play straight. Thus, it becomes a mark of honor to be able to say, "It is
a sad fact that I earned a 'C-' from the great Alexander Bickel in consti-
tutional law, because I could never understand what was going on in
his course."'"
It is sadly ironic that this volume was published in the centenary
year of the publication of The Common Law, 62 in which Holmes at-
tempted to demonstrate that "the law was worthy of intelligent men, "63
and that it "could furnish food for philosophical minds." 6 Darwin,
perhaps, was wrong.
60. R. NEELY, supra note 1, at 18.
61. Id. at 2.
62. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
63. Speziale, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James, Theodore Roosevelt, and the
Strenuous Life, 13 CONN. L. REV. 663, 663 (1981).
64. Id. at 674.
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